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Exclusionary Land Use Controls
and the Taking Issue
By

ROBERT

R.

WRIGHT*

It is somewhat redundant to speak of "exclusionary" land use
controls when the effect of zoning and most of the other forms of
limitations on land use is to exclude or limit certain uses. Whether
cumulative or noncumulative, and however simple or complex the
ordinance may be, the inherent nature of zoning is exclusionary.
The common law of nuisance is exclusionary in the sense that it
provides a vehicle for eliminating certain types of uses in particular areas. Police power ordinances which predated comprehensive
zoning were exclusionary as to the uses against which they were
directed. Subdivision ordinances, with particular reference to exactions, are exclusionary in the.somewhat different sense that they
may affect the economics of a particular situation to the point of
creating market limitations. Efforts by cities to prevent population
growth from outstripping municipal facilities by regulating development on a timed and sequential basis are partially exclusionary.
Underlying these devices, and every other exercise of the police power, is the basic question: When do governmental actions
cross the undefined line between arbitrary and confiscatory action
on the part of the public and valid exercise of the police power?
Admittedly, in cases dealing with exclusionary zoning, there are
other constitutional issues which have been raised in recent
years-civil rights issues, questions of equal protection and substantive due process, the right to travel, and others. But the basic
question in most of these cases remains that of the valid exercise of
the police power as opposed to the confiscatory exercise of it. This
article will explore the exclusionary aspect of land use regulation
as it relates to the taking issue.
* B.A., 1931, University of Arkansas; M.A., 1954, Duke University; J.D., 1956, University of Arkansas; S.J.D., 1967, University of Wisconsin. Donaghey Distinguished Professor of
Law, University of Arkansas Law School, Little Rock.
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I. The Acceptance of the Concept of Exclusion
As previously pointed out, the exercise of land use controls
necessarily sanctions and promotes exclusion. This was recognized
in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company,' in which the United States
Supreme Court first approved a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
The opinion by Justice Sutherland even makes the rather peculiar
point (to us today) that single-family residential neighborhoods
need to be protected from the advance of apartment complexes. 2
He speaks of apartments in a manner similar to that employed by
some courts in the 1950's and 1960's to describe mobile homes.3
The idea basically is that the preferred use-single-family residential-should be protected from what in a given period of time is
viewed either simply as incompatible or as possessing nuisance-like
attributes.
The concept of exclusion, however, stems from older law predating the period of comprehensive zoning. Acts of Parliament and
legislative enactments of the colonies used the device to prevent
activities or to ban types of uses which were deemed to be contrary
to the public interest.' Of course, these were merely early single1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. "With particular reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses,
which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes;
that in such sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order
to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential
character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is followed by
others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and monopolizing
the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and bringing, as
their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of
the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet
and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in" more favored localities,-until, finally, the
residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come
very near to being nuisances." 272 U.S. at 394-95.
3. See, e.g., Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 246-47, 181 A.2d 129, 130-40
(1962), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963). See also, 2 R. ANDERSON, AmERicAN LAw OF ZONING § 14.04 (2d ed. 1976).
4. In thirteenth century England, one of the major problems was highway robbery in
which the thieves would hide among the bushes and trees bordering the narrow highways.
The Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 2, c.5 commanded that highways between
market towns be enlarged and that trees and brush be cut back two hundred feet from
either side of the roadway to prevent a situation in which "a Man may lurk to do hurt." Id.
at c.5. Because of the depletion of spawn and young fish used to feed swine and dogs, the
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purpose exercises of the police power. Laws of this type continued

to be enacted throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and occasionally were challenged on the basis that they were
arbitrary and unreasonable or amounted to confiscation of property without just compensation. Ordinances regulating laundries
(and directed toward the Chinese) both were 5 and were not 6 sustained. In Mugler v. Kansas,7 the Supreme Court in an opinion by
the first Justice Harlan interpreted quite broadly the meaning of
the police power when it upheld a law prohibiting the manufacture
or sale of alcoholic beverages. Although the Court stated that the
police power was not without limitations, 8 the fact that the end
result of the case was to put a brewery out of business and thereby
greatly diminish the value of its property would seem to provide a
rather broad range of permissible action.9 Another ordinance, regulating prostitution in New Orleans, was upheld. 10 These pre-Euclid
cases, however, usually did not involve the morals aspect of the
police power. More typically, they dealt with efforts by governmental authorities to deal with traditional police power considerations
relating to health and safety. This involved, among other things,
the upholding of ordinances prohibiting livery stables,11 the manuuse of various types of nets and methods of taking fish from the rivers and streams was
limited in an act during the time of Elizabeth L 1558, 1 Eliz. 1, c. 17. After the great fire of
London, various building regulations were imposed with respect to construction and building materials. 1666, 19 Car. 2, c. 3. The Massachusetts Bay Colony passed many such acts,
including one environmental regulation intended to prevent farm animals from running at
large and feeding upon the vegetation on Plumb Island in Ipswich Bay. Acts and Resolves of
the Province of Massachusetts Bay 1739-40, c. 8.
5. See, e.g., Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
6. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
7. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
8. Justice Harlan stated, for the Court, that "[tihere are, of necessity, limits beyond
which legislation cannot rightfully go." Id. at 661.
9. One provision went so far as to permit the destruction of existing supplies of alcohol bottled for sale. The extremes of the decision are illustrated further by the statement
that when a prohibition upon use is declared under the police power, this "cannot, in any
just sense be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit" because this "does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property ... nor restrict
his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for
certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests." Id. at 668-69. Justice
Harlan reasoned that to use the police power to destroy property "which is itself a public
nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated" is not a taking. Id. at 669. This statement is obviously extreme in the light of present-day law and circumstances.
10. L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
11. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
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facture of bricks, 2 heavy industrial smoke emissions," s gasoline
storage facilities"' and fertilizer operations. 5
The legal analogy utilized in upholding prohibitive ordinances
of this type was quite commonly the common law doctrine of nuisance."8 The established concept that an individual has the right to
use and enjoy his property without undue interference from his
neighbor17 appeared to the courts to be a hallowed rule of AngloAmerican jurisprudence which could be applied to protect the public. Thus, in the livery stable case, Reinman v. City of Little
Rock,"' the city authorities were ridding the downtown area of a
form of activity which was akin to, and might ultimately amount
to, a public nuisance because of the excrement, odors and flies associated with the activity. This was within the police power, but it
was also buttressed by the familiar maxims of nuisance law. The
convenience of the analogy, even though it stemmed from a different line of jurisprudential thought, seemed quite comforting to
the courts.
Comprehensive zoning carried exclusionary devices a significant step beyond what had gone on before, however, in that local
governments were not, on the surface of things, speaking only of
excluding activities which gave off foul odors or polluted the atmosphere or endangered the public health, safety or morals. Under
comprehensive zoning, a ladies' dress shop or a town house apartment complex could be kept out of a single-family residential area.
12. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
13. Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
14. Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
15. Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
16. This was referred to in numerous cases, including Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 289
U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 587 (1900); and Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
17. The maxim is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas and was almost invariably
quoted by both older and more recent cases.
18. 237 U.S. 587 (1900).
19. After the law reforms of Henry I, in the latter part of the twelfth century, the
king's courts began to encroach particularly into nuisance disputes. The law of nuisance
actually began to take shape even earlier, shortly after the Norman Conquest. Britton, writing around 1300 A.D., regarded the soil as subject to a servitude by law "as, for example, to
the obligation that no one shall do anything in his own soil that may be a grievance or
annoyance to his neighbour." 1 BRrrroN 140b, 289 (F. Nichols ed. 1901). See generally J.
BEUSCHER, R. WmGHT & M. GrrLmAN, LAND UsE 38-41 (2d ed. 1976). Nuisance law is common law, which originated in this early period of time. Zoning came to us from civil law
sources, even though noncomprehensive police power regulations existed prior to comprehensive zoning. Id. at 500-01.
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Nonetheless, in Euclid, after taking into account such considerations as traffic and noise, the Court again drew upon the nuisance
analogy in speaking of apartments.2 0 Even after that case the nuisance analogy was employed as necessity or convenience required.
Since the success of zoning is necessarily dependent on exclusion of uses, it is not surprising that as zoning law became more
sophisticated, judically approved exclusionary devices grew in
number and acceptance. Euclidian zoning is cumulative zoning. It
may be likened to a pyramid, with single-family residential zones
at the apex and with all other uses excluded from such zones. But
the pyramid widens as it descends, and the owner of a lot in a
commercial zone may build a residence there even though he may
ultimately be living next door to a McDonald's or a Holiday Inn.
Noncumulative zoning developed, however, to prevent disparate or
incompatible uses from existing in the same zone.21 Noncumulative
zoning also prevents nuisance litigation, although the defendant
might successfully invoke the familiar "moving to the nuisance"
defense. 2 In any event, the result is to exclude many higher uses
from many or most lower use zones.
Other exclusionary limitations which stemmed from comprehensive zoning were height and bulk limitations, 2s although these
have spawned less litigation than use limitations. In addition to
controls on maximum size or height of structures, these regulations
also led to restrictions on the minimum size. Exclusionary zoning,
as a dirty word or at least as possessing a "bad" connotation, might
be said to spring in large measure from Lionshead Lake v. Township of Wayne, 24 a leading case in the early 1950's. The New
Jersey Court upheld minimum floor areas required for single-family dwellings on the basis that this was an appropriate exercise of
20. See note 2 supra.
21. See generally 1 P. ROHAN, ZOMNG AND LAND USE CONROLS § 1.05[21[e] (1978).
22. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972);
Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (1950); see also Bove
v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229, motion denied, 236 A.D. 775, 258
N.Y.S. 1075 (1932).
23. Bulk zoning relates to the height, size, shape and placement of buildings on lots,
and may affect their shape. The principal purpose is to preserve or provide for light and air
in the area, although it may also implement density and open space considerations. See
Shapiro v. Mayor of Baltimore, 230 Md. 199, 186 A.2d 605 (1962); Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 861
(1965); Goldston & Scheuer, Zoning of Planned Residential Developments, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 241 (1959); Toll, Zoning for Amenities, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 266 (1955).
24. 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
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the police power in protecting the mental health of the occupants.
The minimums were indeed quite minimum, since the ordinance
forbade structures containing less than 768 square feet. The structures in question were 484 square feet and were referred to in the
concurring opinion as "doll houses." Nonetheless, the decision set
off a monumental academic flap, which was roundly debated in the
Harvard Law Review,2 5 and to which some scholars have since returned.2 6 The ruling in the case has generally been followed, and it
is no longer unusual to find such requirements.27 The argument,
presented against such minimums, however, is that they exclude
lower economic groups from the purchase and occupancy of singlefamily dwellings. This, it is argued, is clearly economic discrimination and the overall effect is one of racial discrimination. s This
line of thinking finds probably its best modern judicial expression
in the leading case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel,29 although that case did not invalidate
Lionshead Lake.3 0 Instead it dealt with a zoning situation relating
25. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards:The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 1051 (1953); Nolan & Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space
Requirements, 67 HARv. L. Rnv. 967 (1954). Professor Haar was quite critical of the case,
while Professors Nolan and Horack felt that minimum square foot sizes were appropriate
health considerations of the police power. Haar argued that cases of this type would create
or promote social and economic segregation. Compare Haar's argument with comments in
Babcock, Classificationand Segregation Among Zoning Districts, 1954 U. ILL. L.F. 186,
201-04. Haar's argument regarding economic segregation was influential in later cases and in
the development of more recent exclusionary zoning decisions. However, a review of the
cases in an American Law Report annotation indicates that regulations on minimum floor
space have usually been upheld under the police power. Annot., Validity and Construction
of Zoning Regulations PrescribingMinimum Floorspaceor Cubic Content of Residence, 96
A.L.R.2d 1409 (1964). Nonetheless, the argument of economic segregation and discrimination has seemingly gained in strength in recent years, as indicated by the recent case of
Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).
26. Williams & Wacks, Segregation of Residential. Areas Along Economic Lines:
Lionshead Lake Revisited, 1969 Wis. L. Rav. 827.
27. See authorities cited at note 25 supra; but cf. Home Builders League v. Township
of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979)(minimum floor area requirements invalid as
arbitrary use of police power).
28. In Home Builders League the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: "If the Township's sole purpose in setting up the minima was to provide for more costly residences so as
to exclude lower or moderate income persons, we would strike down this direct form of
economic segregation." Id. at 141, 405 A.2d at 389.
29. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
30. The Mount Laurel decision clearly had a substantial impact on Lionshead Lake
because under Mount Laurel the burden is on the municipality to establish that a valid
basis exists for minimum living space requirements. Id. at 180-81, 336 A.2d at 728. In Home
Builders League v. Township of Berlin, space requirements were not considered to be valid
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to exclusion of low and moderate income housing.
Probably more significant in terms of market limitatiops than
the minimum floor area cases are those dealing with minimum lot
sizes. Market limitations become much more severe when lot size is
limited to a minimum of two or three acres than when the size of
single-family dwellings is limited to no less than 1,200 square feet
in usable floor space.
The "minimum" lot size cases are actually large lot cases. How
big can a local government require a lot to be under the police
power? The answer is somewhat surprising. Although there is no
true uniformity in the cases, lot minimums of three to five acres
have been upheld."1 On the other hand, some courts have invalidated smaller lot sizes which they deemed excessive, as bearing no
genuine relationship to police power considerations.32 Clearly, the
object of much of this large lot zoning, however the arguments in
favor of it may be couched, is exclusion-exclusion from certain
areas or suburban communities of low, moderate and even middle
income people, exclusion of minorities who often fall in the lower
or moderate income categories, exclusion of young people who cannot afford to buy into that type of market, and (probably incidentally) exclusion of older people who either want to or have to live
in apartments or condominiums. In this situation, more clearly
perhaps than in the situation of minimum floor space, zoning can
be perceived as being employed intentionally, rather than incidentially, as an exclusionary device.
The exclusionary potential of large lot requirements was recognized in an early case by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court when, in approving a one-acre minimum, it pointed out that
per se, and the court conceded that the ratio of occupants to space can affect health and
other considerations. 81 N.J. at 141, 405 A.2d at 389-90. See also 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN
LAND PLANNING LAW § 63.01 (1974).
31. See, e.g., Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959)(four-acre
minimum upheld); County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228
A.2d 450 (1967)(five-acre minimum upheld); Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362
Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952)(three-acre minimum upheld); Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) (five-acre
minimum upheld).
32. See, e.g., Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964)(invalidating 100,000 square foot minimums); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970)(striking down two and three-acre minimums)(also captioned as In re Appeal of
Kit Mar Builders); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959) (invalidating a two-acre minimum).
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these restrictions could not be employed to exclude people. 8 A little over twenty years later, the Massachusetts Court invalidated a
100,000 square foot minimum based on the reasoning of the earlier
case and because it found no valid relationship between the regulation itself and police power concerns. 4 Similarly, in NationalLand
and Investment Company v. Kohn,8" the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck down a four-acre minimum in a suburb which stood
in the path of onward urban growth. This case and its reasoning
undoubtably influenced the Mount Laurel decision in New Jersey
about a decade later."
These decisions which invalidated large lot zoning were predicated on traditional considerations. The courts did not find these
to be reasonable exercises of the police power. As to the plaintiffs,
who were landowners or developers, these regulations were found
to be confiscatory. An important element of proof was the amount
by which the value of the land was diminished.3 8 Obviously, the
33. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
34. Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964).
35. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)(also captioned and often cited as National Land
and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township).
36. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). National Land
was influential because it stated that "a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise,
upon the administration of public services and facilities can not be held valid." 419 Pa. at
532, 215 A.2d at 612. Thus, a township could not "stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live." Id. In the subsequent Concord Township Appeal, the same court reaffirmed National Land stating that zoning could not be used to "keep out people, rather
than make community improvements." 439 Pa. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768. (The necessity of
making community improvements to accommodate a growing population is often urged as a
reason for exclusionary regulations.)
37. National Land involved the developers of an eighty-five acre residential tract entitled "Sweetbriar," which already had one-acre minimum lot sizes and which the township
sought to change to four-acre minimums. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970), involved builder-developers.
38. In National Land the value of the tract was reduced from $260,000 to $175,000
(taking the most optimistic figure). 419 Pa. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608. The same court, however, in a previous case, pointed out in rather strong terms that mere diminution in value of
property due to zoning was not enough to invalidate the regulation: "Business operators
[believe] that a variance can be justified by an opportunity to make money, or, conversely,
that it is an abuse of discretion to deny them the opportunity. Such preoccupation with
commerce is not ... what we mean by a variance or by the kind of hardship that justifies
one." Cresko Zoning Case, 400 Pa. 467, 471, 162 A.2d 219, 222 (1960). However, the granting
of a use variance probably should be scrutinized more severely than zoning requiring excessive lot sizes.
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large size of the lots reached a point where the developer could not
expect to attract much of a market assuming the size and cost of a
house was commensurate with the amount of land being allocated
to it. Since the number of lots on which he could build was reduced, the developer's profit margin was severely diminished without any definable public harm being prevented.
Later cases have been predicated more on the ramifications of
exclusion relating to population growth, economic discrimination
and racial implications. These cases relied on combinations of the
exclusionary arguments of the older cases and the civil rights concepts of the mid-1960's to early 1970's. These cases, as in Mount
Laurel,39 were by and large brought by civil rights groups and minorities alleging discrimination, 0 and the taking issue was secondary in this line of cases.
The more recent exclusionary zoning cases, including cases involving civil rights arguments, generally stem in one way or another from the problem of urban sprawl and the growth of suburban communities. Some states, such as Missouri, have permitted
suburban municipalities to restrict quite rigorously the zoning classifications permitted within the community, even to the point of
excludink all uses except single-family residential."1 These practices, which are prevalent in the St. Louis area, obviously have economic and racial overtones, as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit recognized in United States v. City of Black Jack. 2 While
39. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
40. In Mount Laurel, for example, the plaintiffs were (1) residents of the township
living in dilapidated or substandard housing who wanted to secure housing advantages elsewhere in the area; (2) former residents who had to move elsewhere due to lack of suitable
housing; (3) inner city nonresidents living in substandard housing; and (4) three organizations representing racial minorities. 67 N.J. at 159 n.3, 336 A.2d at 717 n.3. No developer
was anywhere to be found as a party plaintiff, although some of the points raised by developers or, at least, expressed by the courts in earlier cases involving exclusion have been
utilized in civil cases of this nature.
41. McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1970),
rev'g City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1963), as urged by
the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which had reluctantly followed Moline Acres in McDermott
v. Village'of Calverton Park, 447 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969). The Missouri Supreme
Court cited Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), and Connor v.
Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957), in support of its position. It
expressed some regret that Moline Acres had led the Michigan Supreme Court to the opposite view (i.e., invalidation of single-family only classifications) in Gunderson v. Village of
Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 715 (1964).
42. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1974).
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the federal court of appeals decision in Black Jack did not by any
means completely override the Missouri Supreme Court's ruling
that such zoning is legally permissible, it did erase its application
to federally financed housing for persons of low and moderate income. This result is quite clear, in any event, as a result of the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Development Corp.48 The Supreme
Court rejected.the conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Mount Laurel that economic exclusion or discrimination was interdicted by the federal Constitution 44-a conclusion which New
Jersey had reached based on its state constitution. 45 Further, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument of some courts, including
(although not expressly) the Eighth Circuit in Black Jack, that the
discriminatory effect or impact of such zoning violated the Constitution. 8 Instead, as to such zoning (which existed in a Chicago
suburb in much the same manner as in the St. Louis suburbs), the
Supreme Court required the showing of discriminatory intentexcept as to federally financed public housing projects. It was suggested that lesser proof would be required in the latter situation
because of the intent of federal housing and civil rights legislation.
The Seventh Circuit, upon reconsideration of the question, arrived
at a lesser test for exclusion of such housing projects,47 and the
43. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
44. Id. See generally Wright, Constitutional Rights and Land Use Planning: The
New and the Old Reality, 1977 DuKE L.J. 841 (1978).
45. "It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter at what level
of government, must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of substantive
due process and equal protection of the laws. These are inherent in Art. I, par. 1 of our
Constitution, the requirements of which may be more demanding than those of the federal
Constitution." 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 725 (footnote omitted).
46. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
47. The case was iemanded to the Seventh Circuit to consider whether a showing of
something less than discriminatory intent might be sufficient in cases involving the locating
of public housing in a municipality zoned solely or pirimarily for single-family use. The court
of appeals concluded that something less than a showing of clear discriminatory intent
would suffice because of the public policy and statutory obligation embodied in the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1976). Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The
court also concluded that in the case of public housing, zoning could be used in guch a way
as to preclude construction of low-cost housing. This was interpreted by the district court as
meaning that the presence or absence of a discriminatory effect would be decisive. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 469 F.Supp. 836, 842 (N.D. Ill.
1979), afl'd, 616 F.2d 1006 (7th Cir. 1980). One major factor bearing upon the question was
whether there was other land in Arlington Heights which was zoned to permit federally
subsidized housing. If there was no such land, then the Fair Housing Act was deemed to be
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Supreme Court tacitly approved.'8
As a result of these housing cases, an additional problem has
been posed by the Eighth Circuit in the most recent of the Black
Jack cases.' 9 This is the question of whether, having by its action
prevented a public housing project which should have been entitled to locate there and having thus in effect destroyed the project,
a community should be required to take affrmative steps to correct the situation by taking action which would create such a housing project (or otherwise compensate for its original action). In
short, having sinned, should the municipality be forced to expiate
its actions by way of restitution? The Eighth Circuit answered affirmatively, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.5 0 This decision is in line with the philosophy of the lower

court in Mount Laurel and the Seventh Circuit opinion in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority,51 which apparently envision
violated. The district court decision, cited above, approved an annexation proposal agreed
upon between the parties which would provide the necessary land within the boundaries of
Arlington Heights.
48. The Supreme Court denied certiorari of the Seventh Circuit's opinion. 434 U.S.
1025 (1978).
49. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980).
50. Id. This would seem to go beyond the Arlington Heights decision.
51. 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974)(afflrmed in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)).
The late Justice Tom C. Clark, sitting by assignment, wrote the Seventh Circuit opinion,
which sought to fit the housing situation into the mold of affirmative relief in school desegregation and busing cases. He distinguished Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which
had reversed an order requiring consolidation of local school districts in the Detroit area
thereby interfering with the functions of local government without proof of a constitutional
violation. Justice Clark used Milliken as a basis for stating that area-wide solutions in connection with public housing could be required when housing patterns demanded it. In affirming the case, the opinion by Justice Potter Stewart also discusses Milliken at some
length and reaches the conclusion that the requirement of dispersal of public housing
throughout the Chicago area did not involve coercion of units of local government because
the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD were authorized to operate outside the city limits
and local governmental units were not really affected by such activity.
In Mount Laurel, 161 N.J. 317, 319 A.2d 935 (1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court did
not require supervision by the lower court of the township's acceptance of its "fair share" of
such housing. The case was explicitly followed in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977). Subsequent litigation involved an action alleging failure by the township to alter its zoning in such a manner as to be in compliance.
There was intervention by a mobile home developer. The superior court upheld the township's conclusions as to "fair share." Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 391 A.2d 935 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1978). See also Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979); Fobe Associates v. Borough of Demarest, 74
N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977); Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor and Council of Washington, 74 N.J.
470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977). Compare the Mount Laurel case with Berenson v. Town of New
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court involvement in this process on a scale approximating judicial
involvement in the desegregation and school busing decisions.
In any event, one-use zoning provides another basis for potential exclusion except with regard to federal housing projects, and
except in New Jersey or in states which adhere to the Mount Lau5
rel view or which, as stated, reject the validity of such zoning. s
Even in the case of public housing projects, the Supreme Court in
James v. Valtierra5s and in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises," provided the constitutional basis to undercut such
projects through the device of the referendum. This may be regarded as being in line with the rejection of the economic discrimination and exclusionary effect argument, but it is curiously naive
to assume that such referenda do not have socio-economic and,
quite probably, racial overtones.5 5
There is another suburban problem other than the desire of
homeowners and developers to maintain an attractive, single-family community free, or largely free, from apartments or commercial
operations. This is the problem of the suburban community having
to accommodate itself to rapid growth along with the concommitant requisite of providing adequate public facilities to serve the
growing population. Obviously, extensive single-family zoning
eliminates or helps to alleviate the problem in jurisdictions where
it is permitted subject to the federal limitations stemming from
Arlington Heights. The New Jersey Court in Mount Laurel, however, took an entirely different view. That court required that the
township accept its "fair share" of the population expansion occurring within the general area. The township could not, to paraphrase the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in National Land, stand
as a barrier in the path of urban growth. While the Mount Laurel
opinion did not define "fair share" or impose affirmative guidelines, the New Jersey Court has subsequently elaborated on the
Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
52. See Gunderson v. Village of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 715
(1964); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931); Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975).
53. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
54. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
55. This was pointed out in the dissent by Justice Thurgood Marshall in James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 143, in which he was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun. The

California referendum provision was specifically directed at federally or state financed low
income housing.
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subject.56 Cases of this type have been the primary vehicle utilized
to erode or eliminate exclusionary zoning. Courts have also, almost
uniformly, pointed out the need for regional or state-wide planning
as a means of largely correcting this problem and eliminating the
vast majority of these cases. 57 This is in line with the thinking of
practically all of the scholars in this field, "" and is in accord with
the Model Land Development Code. 9 It seems obvious that with
planning addressing itself to a region which cuts across local govermnental boundary lines and even across state lines, the end result could provide adequately for the accommodation of all forms
of housing and land uses within the general area. It is the ancient
adherence to regulation by each locality without consideration of
the condition of nearby or adjoining local governments that produces much of the problem. Courts have at times forced consideration of the impact of a particular action upon adjoining localities.6 0
But only in recent years have some states given attention to the
need for planning on a regional or statewide basis,6 1 and the continuing conduct of planning and zoning on a local level provides
the basis for much of this type of litigation.
The growth-limiting device which has most successfully withstood constitutional attacks relating to exclusion is that involving
planned growth controls. This is a timed and sequential form of
growth which does not prevent population expansion but limits it
to coincide sequentially with a plan for the development of
overburdened community facilities. This device was approved by
56. See Fobe Associates v. Borough of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977);
Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor and Council of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 379 A.2d 6 (1977).
57. Mount Laurel makes this point, but so do such cases as Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) and the dissent in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d
359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
58. See, e.g., Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 515 (1957); Hagman, Regionalized-Decentralism:A Model for Rapprochement in Los
Angeles, 58 GEo. L.J. 901 (1970); Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L.
Rav. 1 (1971).
59.

MOnEL LAND DEvELoPmENT CODE

§ 7-201

(allowing a state land planning agency to

designate areas of critical state concern), §§ 7-301 to 7-305 (attempting to deal with some
regional concerns).
60. Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
(Dumont was not permitted to rezone in disregard to the impact upon adjoining boroughs).
See also Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968)
(granting standing to a local government in New Jersey to sue in federal court with respect
to rezoning action taken by an adjoining New York municipality).
61. E.g., HAwAn REv. STAT. §§ 205-1 to 205-37 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN.
396 (West Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6091 (1973).

§8 462.381

to
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the New York Court of Appeals in Golden v. PlanningBoard6 2 and
subsequently by the Ninth Circuit in ConstructionIndustry Asso63
ciation v. City of Petaluma.
Not every such scheme will meet
with court approval.' There are at least five basic requisites for
approval: (1) the plan must be preceded by an extensive study relating to the intensity of population influx and housing demand,
the effect of the same upon such public facilities as schools,
firefighting units, parks and recreational facilities, the water and
sewer system, police protection, traffic and street capacity, and the
general ability of the city to cope from a planning standpoint; (2)
the study must result in a plan which attempts to deal with the
needs and concerns addressed by the study, but which is aimed
toward providing the necessary facilities over a reasonable period
of time and which limits population influx only as necessary to
comply with a carefully conceived plan; (3) the undertaking must
not be a "pie in the sky" proposal but must have the necessary
financial support and commitment to make it function; (4) there
must be "escape valves" or "safety hatches" through which developers or landowners may either obtain such special exceptions as
may seem appropriate or may achieve compliance in some other
way, as by personal financial commitments; and (5) population
growth may not be halted and must be permitted to continue on a
reasonable basis in conjunction with the plan. The cases approving
devices of this type reject on the one hand the idea that such plans
interfere with the right to travel or move from place to place, 65 and
they implicitly reject the argument that growth can be prevented if
local facilities are overburdened. The clear meaning is that subur62. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).

63. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
64. Such plans cannot directly infringe upon the right to travel unhindered from state
to state. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Cf. Associated Home Builders v. City of
Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976)(ordinance upheld). More-

over, both the New York Court of Appeals and the federal Ninth Circuit make it clear that
such plans cannot amount to cleverly disguised schemes intended to exclude newcomers.
Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d at 378, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at
152; Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 906.
Compare Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63 Cal. Rptr.
889 (1967), which dealt with a plan which seems patently to be a scheme to limit growth
severely, but which did not involve an area experiencing a rapid influx of population or a

town in the path of outward urban growth.
65. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941).
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ban communities in the path of rapid expansion cannot prevent
population influx, but they can reasonably regulate it. This device
obviously takes into account regional problems, but the end result
is to sanction a constitutionally limited, although seemingly reasonable, power of exclusion.
The foregoing exemplifies both the acceptance of exclusion
and the attacks upon exclusion based upon (a) the fundamental
concept that if a regulation is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and amounts to a taking, then it is invalid; and (b) more
recent arguments relating to constitutional questions such as racial
discrimination and, with not the same degree of acceptance, economic discrimination. But the discussion would be incomplete
without pointing out that certain uses have traditionally been preferred while others have been viewed essentially as nuisance-like in
character. Ever since Euclid, the preferred and most protected use
has been the single-family classification-a point that was reinforced in more recent years by the Supreme Court decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas6s and, if anything, was strengthened
rather than weakened by a subsequent five-to-four Supreme Court
decision invalidating, an incredibly narrow and defective "single
family" definition. 7 The felt need of the Court in Euclid to protect
the single-family neighborhood from apartment houses was later
manifested in the mobile home cases.6 8 While more recent court
decisions have tended to recognize the need to make provision for
the use of mobile homes,6 9 it would be foolish not to recognize that
66. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
67. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Under this ridiculous ordinance, the word "family" was so rigidly circumscribed that some persons related by blood
could not live together. Here, it was a crime for a grandmother to live with her grandson
because his uncle and cousin lived there. An adult brother and sister could not share a
household. The most noteworthy aspect of the case is that four Justices of the United States
Supreme Court would have upheld an ordinance that should have failed on the basis of
patent stupidity and irrelevancy to the police power prior even to arriving at other constitutional considerations. Id. at 521 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 531 (Stewart, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting).
68. One of the most obvious examples is the well-known case of Vickers v. Township
Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129, appeal dismissed, cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1962), although the case is known principally for the dissent of Justice Hall,
who later wrote the majority opinion in Mount Laurel. An opposite result to Vickers, and a
more modern view of mobile homes, is found in Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home
Court, 111 R.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465 (1973), where the court stated that today one out of every
five new dwellings is a mobile home and that such parks can no longer be viewed as gathering places for nomads.
69. See Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, 111,.I. 120, 300 A.2d 465

560

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 8:545

this is a form of residential use that will be permitted, if at all, in
the least desirable of residential zones and possibly in lower zones.
This patchwork of exclusion is readily illustrated by several
other examples. Churches, for example, are viewed by some courts
as not being subject to exclusion at all from residential areas on
the ground that this would violate the First Amendment to the
federal Constitution."0 Other ordinances would permit churches as
conditional uses in such areas7 1 or permit churches to be excluded
where residential use is itself restricted and there are other satisfactory locations available for them in the area. 2 The problem of
how to deal with churches stems from the fact that some modern
churches are huge conglomerations of churches, parish or recreational halls, gyms or athletic and recreational facilities and
grounds, and parish schools. Thus, the potential impact of a
"church" upon a neighborhood may be greater than that of some
quiet commercial operations. Yet churches have always occupied a
favored status. The same may be said for schools 3 and for historic
(1973); see also Oak Forest Mobile Home Park v. City of Oak Forest, 27 Ill. App. 3d 303,
326 N.E.2d 473 (1975) (ordinance held void where it prohibited trailer parks anywhere
within the city); Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604
(1975); Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield, 394 Mich. 574, 232 N.W.2d 616 (1975); Sabo V.
Township of Monroe, 394 Mich. 531, 232 N.W.2d 584 (1975); Green v. Township of Lima, 40
Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972); Meyers v. Board of Supervisors, 394 A.2d 669
(Com. Ct. Pa. 1978); Board of Supervisors v. Barness, 382 A.2d 140 (Com. Ct. Pa. 1978);
Nicholas, Heim & Kissinger v. Township of Harris, 375 A.2d 1383 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
Compare Clackamas County v. Ague, 27 Or. App. 515, 556 P.2d 1386 (1976) with Columbia
County v. Kelly, 548 P.2d 163 (Ct. App. Or. 1976)(nuisance allegations with respect to mobile homes).
70. See City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944). "To exclude
churches from residential districts does not promote the health, the safety, the morals or the
general welfare of the community, and to relegate them to business and manufacturing districts could conceivably result in imposing a burden upon the free right to worship and, in
some instances, in prohibiting altogether the exercise of that right. An ordinance fraught
with that danger will not be enforced." Id. at 119, 183 S.W.2d at 417. State ex rel. Synod v.
Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942). "We seriously question the constitutionality
of any enactment that seeks flatly to prohibit the erection of churches in residential districts." Id. at 240, 39 N.E.2d at 520. See also Board of Zoning Appeals v. Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
71. See, e.g., West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn.
263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330
P.2d 5 (1958); State ex rel. Lake Dr. Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 585, 108
N.W.2d 288 (1961).
72. See, e.g., Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d
880 (Fla. 1955).
73. Compare Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289
P.2d 438 (1955), and Langbein v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 135 Conn. 575, 67 A.2d 5 (1949),
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landmarks. Historic preservation districts involve a form of exclusion throughout a substantial area.""
On the other hand, such uses as funeral homes, guidance centers for the rehabilitation of criminal offenders, fraternities or
clubs, and various types of homes or schools for juvenile delinquents or the mentally retarded are viewed as non-preferred uses
or even as nuisances which should be eliminated from residential
areas.7 5 In the case of funeral homes, they are customarily regarded
as nuisances in residential or predominantly residential areas.76
Whether the courts say so or not, these other uses are viewed as
having nuisance-like characteristics. Be that as it may, these are
also illustrations of judicial acceptance of the concept of exclusion
as well as the basic, underlying rationale. The device is an inextricable part of the fabric of planning and zoning.
with Chicago v. Sachs, 1 Ill. 2d 342, 115 N.E.2d 762 (1953), and State ex rel. Wisconsin
Lutheran High School Conf. v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43, appealdismissed, 349 U.S.
913 (1954). While these cases illustrate different approaches taken by the courts to different
types of schools (e.g., public versus private, pre-kindergarten school versus grade school or
high school), the ordinances involved all illustrate the favored status of schools.
74. Laws preserving historic or cultural districts have generally been upheld. City of
New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953), and City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941) (the Vieux Carre); Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955) (Beacon Hill); Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket); City of Santa Fe v. GambleSkogmo, 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (Old Santa Fe). A somewhat unique case, Rebman
v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969), created' a four-block
historic district to preserve and protect only one structure-Lincoln's home. The effect of
these cases is to control the architecture and appearance of a substantial area and prevent
discordant land uses.
75. See, e.g., Powell v. Taylor, 222 Ark. 896, 263 S.W.2d 906 (1954)(funeral home);
Fraser v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942)(funeral home);
Arkansas Release Guidance Foundation v. Needler, 252 Ark. 194, 477 S.W.2d 821 (1972)
("half-way house'); City of Schenectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union Chapter, 5 A.D.2d 14,
168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957) (23 members of fraternity held not to constitute a single family
unit); Wiltwyck School for Boys v. Hill, 14 A.D.2d 198, 219 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1961) (school for
delinquent or emotionally disturbed boys found to have potential for rehabilitation was prohibited in an area allowing private, parochial and public schools); but see State ex rel. Cunningham v. Feezell, 218 Tenn. 17, 400 S.W.2d 716 (1966) (crematorium not a nuisance in
sparsely settled area); Nicholson v. Connecticut Half-way House, 153 Conn. 507, 218 A.2d
383 (1966) (half-way house not a nuisance); Laporte v. City of New Rochelle, 2 N.Y.2d 921,
141 N.E.2d 917, 161 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1957) (60 student members of a religious order occupying a Roman Catholic college building were single family unit).
76. See Powell v. Taylor, 222 Ark. 896, 263 S.W.2d 906 (1954); Fraser v. Fred Parker
Funeral Home, 201 S.C. 88, 21 S.E.2d 577 (1942).
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II. Exclusion as a Taking: Approaches and
Viewpoints
If planning and its necessary handmaiden, zoning, are based
largely on the power to exclude, then the essential question is how
far that power extends before it constitutes confiscation of property. This taking issue is the traditional problem and remains of
more immediacy in the vast majority of cases than the individual
civil rights issues which arose in such cases as Arlington Heights,"
0 and in a somewhat
Mount Laurel,78 Black Jack7 9 Gautreaux,8
81
different context, Petaluma.
A.

The Traditional Conflict

It has been observed that nineteenth century America, for all
of its emphasis on the rights which inhere in the ownership of
property, was somewhat liberal in court interpretations of the limits of the police power.8 2 This is illustrated by a number of state
court cases predating the Civil War and by the Supreme Court decision in Mugler v. Kansas," mentioned earlier. This line of cases
seemed to indicate that nothing less than a physical taking of
property was required before the courts would invalidate statutes
or ordinances based on the police power."
An exception to this line of cases is the opinion of Justice
Holmes in Rideout v. Knox,85 rendered while he was a justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. This case might be
said to have presaged his viewpoint in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,8 in which the Supreme Court concluded that if police
power regulation was carried too far, it could constitute a taking.
77.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

78. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
79. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1974).
80. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
81. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
82. See generally F. BosSELMAN, D. C uias & J. BANTA, THE TAuNaG IssuE 106-23
(1973).
83. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
84. See F. BossLMA, D. CM uns & J. BANTA, supra note 82.
85. 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889).
86. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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This case was decided four years prior to Euclid and should be
read in conjunction with Nectow v. City of Cambridge8 7 which followed shortly after Euclid. Taken together, they tell us this: Under
Euclid, comprehensive zoning is deemed to be a valid exercise of
the police power; under Pennsylvania Coal, the lengths to which a
police power regulation may go until it constitutes a taking is a
matter to be decided on a case-by-case basis because it depends on
the particular facts involved; and under Nectow, a zoning ordinance which is so arbitrary as to amount to a taking is invalid as to
that particular piece of property. This is basically the approach
which has prevailed over the past fifty years or more.
Of the cases which form this equation, the most exasperating
one to a number of scholars is Pennsylvania Coal.s8 Anyone seeking guidelines or any degree of certainty in determining when a
police power regulation goes so far in its exclusionary aspects as to
amount to a confiscation of property or an arbitrary and unreasonable diminution in value cannot find it in that case. He must instead argue by analogy from other cases or seize upon the comments of other courts. In the pursuit of elusive guidelines, scholars
have periodically attempted to identify criteria which may be useful in predicting or determining the result. 89 Despite the lamentations of those seeking some more definite determinant of the question, this is about all that can be done under the state of the law
now and in the foreseeable future. With that in mind, it is appropriate to categorize the identifiable criteria and provide some educated assessment of the relative importance or weight to be accorded to these considerations.
1. Market Value
In the best of all possible worlds, as viewed through the eyes
of developers, the use of land would be at least as unfettered as it
is in Houston, which has no comprehensive zoning. To some developers, it would be a blessing if the views of Mikhail Bakunin ° rela87.
88.

277 U.S. 183 (1928).
F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BAmTA, supra note 82, probably launched the most

extensive attack of anyone.
89. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by PolicePower: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria,44 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970).

90. Bakunin was an influential anarchist of the nineteenth century who opposed
Marxism but had no well-defined philosophy of government. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRiTTANICA
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tive to organized society could at least be superimposed upon the
police power. Then, a hamburger heaven or a pizza palace or .a
Colonel Chicken could blossom at will amidst costly single-family
homes, expensive condominiums and country clubs. The market
value would rule. If the "highest and best use" (a term which real
estate interests translate from the law of eminent domain to apply
to land use regulations in applicable situations) were to govern,
then planning and zoning would be negated. 9 1 Of course, a long
line of case law points out that the mere fact that the landowner
cannot obtain the most profit from his land is no basis for changing or invalidating the zoning classification. 92 The question is
whether the regulation is so arbitrary as to severely diminish the
value or greatly impair the owner's ability to make reasonable use
of the property. If the owner were unable to make use or reasonable use of the land, it would be invalidated as a taking.93 While
that is quite clear, it should be recognized that there are other
cases which invalidate the regulation where the loss in value due to
the regulation is deemed to be excessive or severe. 4 In this latter
line of cases, the courts usually also find that there is little or no
countervailing public need to be served as a result of the regulation.95 Consequently, unless the ordinance vitiates any potential
land use or renders the land potentially worthless as a result of the
regulation, the end result of a substantial lessening in value must
be viewed concomitantly with other factors. While those who prefer certitude or a litmus paper approach to the law may not like
this, it would seem to be unavoidable. The law is after all a social
607 (15th ed. 1978).
91. Cf. Van Alstyne, supra note 89, at 36-37.
92. Cresko Zoning Case, 400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960), points this out quite candidly in a case involving a variance. But Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, also rejects an argument that the market value for industrial use of certain land is about $10,000 per acre while the market value for residential
purposes is not more than $2,500 per acre. Id. at 384. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
93. This was the basis of Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), which
followed on the heels of Euclid. See also Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d
375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 27 IL 2d
116, 188 N.E.2d 33 (1963); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938).
94. See, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965)
(the diminution caused by four-acre lot minimums reduced the value of the total land package from $260,000 to $175,000).
95. Id. See also Duggan v. Cook County, 60 IlM.2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975); Langguth v. Village of Mount Prospect, 5 DI.2d 49, 124 N.E.2d 879 (1955).
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process, not an exact science like chemistry.
Interrelated with this consideration, obviously, is the propriety
of the existing zoning. The comprehensive plan for the area may
no longer conform to the zoning and thus a rezoning of some kind
would be appropriate.96 This, of course, does not mean that the
proposal of the landowner or developer would necessarily be appropriate. He might want to build a supermarket or a shopping
center when an apartment or condominium development or a classification for neighborhood offices and small shops would be more
suitable. It does mean, however, that the existing zoning might be
incompatible with nearby uses and might be subject to invalidation
on that basis.
2. Public Harm and Public Benefit
A case which thoughtfully illustrates these considerations is
Just v. Marinette County," in which the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld a shoreland zoning statute and regulations pertaining
thereto with respect to inland waterways. The effect of the statute
was to require counties to adopt shoreland zoning ordinances
which were subject to approval by a state agency. If a county did
not enact an ordinance, the same state agency would provide it
with one. The purpose was to protect the state's navigable waters
and the rights of the public in these waters from deterioration due
to uncontrolled shoreland development. The result of the Marinette County ordinance was to prevent the plaintiff from utilizing
fill-dirt to convert a marshy area into land on which structures
could be built. The basic issue was whether the restrictions on such
wetlands amounted to a taking. The Wisconsin Court stated the
issue in this way:
[I]t is a conflict between the public interest in stopping the despoliation of natural resources, which our citizens until recently
have taken as inevitable and for granted, and an owner's asserted
right to use his property as he wishes. The protection of public
rights may be accomplished by the exercise of the police power
96. While consideration of the surrounding area is an essential factor, Duggan v. Cook
County, 60 II. 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975), Maryland evolved a peculiar rule to the effect
that a zoning amendment was only appropriate when there had been a mistake in the original enactment or a sufficient physical and use change in the immediate area. Finney v.
Halle, 241 Md. 224, 216 A.2d 530 (1966); see 1 N. WLLums, AMmcAN LAND PLANNING LAW
§§ 6.06, 32.01 (1975).
97. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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unless the damage to the property owner is too great and
amounts to a confiscation. The securing or taking of a benefit not
presently enjoyed by the public for its use is obtained by the government through its power of eminent domain ....
In the valid
exercise of the police power reasonably restricting the use of
property, the damage suffered by the owner is said to be incidental. However, where the restriction is so great the landowner
ought not to bear such a burden for the public good, the restriction has been held to be a constructive taking even though the
actual use or forbidden use has not been transferred to the government so as to be a taking in the traditional sense.98

In further developing this line of thought, the court adopted a
test employed many years before by Professor Ernst Freund who
differentiated eminent domain and the police power in this manner: "the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful. ''9
" Thus, compensation is given for losses stemming from
acquisition of a benefit not previ6usly belonging to the public; and
compensation is denied when the police power is employed to prevent a public harm.10 0 Freund seemed not to be bothered by the
taking question, if his language is accepted literally. Both were a
kind of taking in the sense that certain rights were lost. But compensation was given only for acquisition of the property itself or of
rights "inthe property. Preventing substantial public harm was
noncompensable. Following this thinking, the Wisconsin court concluded that the state had a duty to prevent pollution of navigable
streams, which amounted to the prevention of a public harm
rather than the acquisition of rights not previously owned by the
98. Id. at 14-15, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Van Alstyne, supra note 89, in an article which predated Just, comments on this
phenomenon: "Viewed in this way, the 'confiscation' theory emerges as a conventional balancing concept, with the variables of private loss and public benefit being weighed on the
judicial scales .... [A] holding of invalidity is most likely when both variables tend to favor
that result, 'If the gain to the public is small, from rezoning real estate, and the hardship to
the owner is great, no valid reason exists for the exercise of such police power.' On the other
hand, if the scales are not tipped in favor of invalidity in the manner just described, even a
very substantial private loss may still be regarded by the courts as insufficient to justify
invalidating an otherwise reasonable legislative judgment." Id. at 39 (citation omitted). In a
case subsequent to Just, the Illinois Supreme Court listed as a factor to be considered the
relative gain to the public as opposed to the hardship suffered by the property owner.
Duggan v. Cook County, 60 L 2d 107, 324 N.E.2d 406 (1975).
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state.101
Just represents a rather uncommon effort on the part of a
court to explain the rationale underlying the valid exercise of the
police power. Scholars generally have found it necessary to probe
collections of cases which seem to say something, which can be encapsulated in turn to shed some light on the question. In an article
written prior to the Just decision, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne
spoke of "governmental asset enhancement" as being an improper
public objective. 102 Thus, a regulation which limited a landowner

to having certain property designated for use as a park, playground
or school would not be appropriate. 103 Even where this action was a
prelude to some indefinite future condemnation, it would not suffice to overcome the burden imposed upon private property. Even
in situations in which public controls on land use attempt to address a particular public problem and in which a clear public interest is involved, the regulation must be sufficiently limited and narrowly enough defined that the courts do not feel that the
regulation is excessive. Some of the better known floodplain cases
are illustrative of this,'0 and in the Just case, the Wisconsin court
went to some effort to distinguish these cases.
Obviously, what is involved in many of these cases is a balancing process involving the value judgments both of state and local
governments on the one hand and the courts on the other. The
importance to the public of averting some perceived harm clearly
affects the outcome. The Wisconsin shoreland legislation and the
case approving it came in a period in which there was a strong
national preoccupation with problems relating to ecology and the
environment. Although those sentiments remain, environmental
concerns might not have quite as exalted a status today if pitted
against public concerns relating to energy. The public harm to be
101. It would seem, however, that as the discussion under the preceding note indicates, we are still speaking of a process of weighing variables. The public harm to be prevented must be quite substantial unless the private loss is relatively small. Further, if the
harm to be prevented is relatively insubstantial, but the private loss suffered is quite great,
then the regulation would be unreasonable. In that situation, to follow Freund's analysis, it
would seem that a public benefit was being acquired.
102. Van Alstyne, supra note 89, at 23.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Commn'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d
770 (1964); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
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prevented as contrasted to the acquisition of a public benefit is
something which may ebb and flow depending upon the particular
situation or the felt needs of a given time. Moreover, as cases involving airports and airport zoning illustrate, judicial attitudes or
value judgments may differ from those of legislative bodies or public agencies. 10 5
What this means also is that courts do not necessarily do what
they purport to do. This comes as no revelation to lawyers, but it is
unusually apparent in the regulation of land use. The majority of
courts accord to zoning a legislative presumption-i.e., the action
will be sustained unless the governmental body acted in an arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable manner in doing or refusing to
do what it did. 106 Some courts in recent years have recognized that
this is nonsense.10 7 When the issue involves a rezoning application
or some administrative relief, as opposed to a comprehensive rezoning or a new zoning ordinance, the property involved almost
invariably is a rather limited parcel of land. The action is an ad
hoc administrative or quasi-judicial act which usually has little or
nothing to do with broad public policy considerations. But if the
action taken is given the benefit of the legislative presumption, as
most courts purport to do, then the action taken must be judicially
approved unless it is confiscatory or patently stupid and obviously
erroneous. Courts in purporting to follow this principle have stated
that if there is any room for doubt, the legislative presumption requires approval of the governmental action. But no one involved in
this field can believe very seriously that courts do this in fact, and
there is considerable doubt that they should. Abuses at the local
105. See, e.g., Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Griggs V.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641
(1964); Yara Eng'r Corp. v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945); see also R.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AmsPACE 192-93 (1968).
106. See City of Phoenix v. Beall, 22 Ariz. App. 141, 524 P.2d 1314 (1974); Kropf v.
City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
107. In South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt, 482 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 901 (1974), the Fifth Circuit distinguished the adoption of a comprehensive plan or
the original zoning ordinance from the process of rezoning, which amounted to administrative action. The concurring opinion in Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215
N.W.2d 179 (1974), argued that rezoning was an ad hoc administrative process. Id. at 164,
215 N.W.2d at 190 (Levin, J., concurring). A leading case is Fasano v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), in which the Oregon Supreme Court recognized
that although most jurisdictions accord zoning and rezoning the legislative presumption,
rezoning is actually something of a judicial process. See also Chrobuck v. Snohomish
County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971).
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level, where developers and real estate interests overwhelm local
officials and generally ravage the public interest, have led some
courts to abandon the legislative presumption and point up the
foolishness of its application. 08 But other courts which purport to
follow the presumption have little difficulty in finding an action to
be arbitrary and unreasonable if it offends values which they feel
to be of higher priority. Thus, it is not difficult for a "property
oriented" court, for example, to find an action to be arbitrary or
confiscatory if it offends that particular court's attitude toward
land use regulations. 10 9 Another obvious example is found in cases
involving aesthetics. There is a marked difference in viewpoint between the expression of Justice William 0. Douglas in Berman v.
Parker'" (and the statements of other courts which adhere to the
same view)" and the general rule that while aesthetic considerations may be taken into account, police power regulations cannot
be grounded solely upon aesthetic considerations." 2 Judicial attitudes become even more apparent when one contrasts the general
rule on aesthetic considerations with the cases which have almost
uniformly upheld historic and cultural preservation ordinances. 113
If aesthetics cannot stand alone as a valid objective of the police
power, it must be pondered whether preservation of an historic
district is somehow less aesthetic than the preservation or improvement of the general urban environment.
Clearly, then, terminology such as "public harm" to be prevented or "public benefit" to be acquired depends in its application upon the problems and circumstances of the times and the
values or attitudes of those who pass judgment.
108. Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961); Lowe v. City of
Missoula, 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551 (1974); and cases cited note 107 supra.
109. This illustrates the problem with courts engaging in what might generally be
called "judicial zoning." For one state's experience, see Gitelman, JudicialReview of Zoning
in Arkansas, 23 AR. L. Rxv. 22 (1969). In invalidating zoning regulations, the Arkansas
court often resorts to the hyperbole of the Arkansas Constitution: "The right of property is
before and higher than any other constitutional sanction." ARK. CONsT. art. 2, § 22.
110. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
111. See State v. Diamond Motors, 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
112. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d
828 (1973); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Farley v. Graney,
146 W. Va. 22, 119 S.E.2d 833 (1960).
113. See cases cited at note 74 supra.
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3. The Interests of Other Landowners
It is an oversimplification from a practical standpoint to speak
only in terms of the public interest or of the interest of one landowner as opposed to the public interest. Theoretically, this is all
that is involved. The interests and views of neighboring landowners are taken into account in considering the interests of the public
and the conformity of the action taken in relation to the plan of
development in the area involved. But no one who has ever-had
much experience with these matters as they operate on the local
level believes that the process is that simple.1 14 Therefore, unless
we are to ignore reality, we must recognize that neighboring landowners affect the outcome and thereby form part of the equation.
Scholars have written, from time to time, on the effect that
11 5
neighboring landowners have on the zoning or rezoning process.
Without replowing that ground extensively, it should suffice to say
that when a substantial number of people protest a proposal it is
far more likely to be denied either at the planning commission
level or city council level, or both, than is the case if no one objects. This is particularly true at the city legislative level, which is
generally more politically oriented than the planning commission.
Nor should it be assumed that this factor is lost on courts. It is not
unusual for an appellate court to comment on whether the neighboring property owners protested or not and, if they did, the numbers involved.11 6 If politics can be set aside (or to the extent that
that is possible), the unarticulated theory seems to be something
like this: (a) many property owners protested, and therefore, since
they view their property as being harmed, this proposal may be
deemed to be detrimental to the public generally and approval of
it would be arbitrary and unreasonable; or (b) no one protested,
and therefore, since no one in the area thought his property was
affected, this proposal may be deemed to be appropriate in terms
114. The author has for several years served as a member and now vice-chairman of
the City of Little Rock Planning Commission and as chairman of its Zoning Committee.
115. See Gitelman, The Role of the Neighbors in Zoning Cases, 28 ARK. L. Rnv. 221
(1975).
116. See, e.g., Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949); Cresko
Zoning Case, 400 Pa. 467, 162 A.2d 219 (1960); Application of Devereaux Foundation, Inc.,
351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 686 (1945); see also the Arkansas cases
cited in Gitelman, note 115 supra, particularly Olsen v. City of Little Rock, 241 Ark. 155,
406 S.W.2d 706 (1966) (no neighbors protested) and City of Jonesboro v. Arnold, 255 Ark.
939, 504 S.W.2d 351 (1974)(no protests).
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of the public interest and denial of it would be arbitrary and
unreasonable.
From a legal standpoint, this is nonsense. If someone owns
land which cannot be developed under the existing zoning, the desire of the neighboring landowners to retain it as open space cannot be honored no matter how many people object to a different
classification. What the neighbors want in that situation is obviously arbitrary, unreasonable and confiscatory. On the contrary,
merely because no one objects to a proposal does not render it irrational to deny rezoning or administrative relief if it would in fact
violate the comprehensive plan for the area or have adverse effects
on the neighborhood.
Why, then, should we concern ourselves at all with this consideration? Obviously, if it does affect the outcome, then past or present scholarly preaching cannot excise it. It is what might be called
a legally invalid consideration which acquires its validity from the
fact that it influences the result. It is an otherwise illegitimate consideration, legitimated by its effect. To the extent that it has any
legitimacy, it would have to stem either from the"facts produced by
protesting neighbors or from a judicial assumption or inference
that if so many people believe they are being harmed, then perhaps they are.""
4. Facts Specifically Related to the Property

This final consideration is actually interrelated with the first
one on market value. If the property in question is not suitable for
the use for which it is zoned, this will obviously diminish the market value substantially and probably cause a denial of rezoning to
be viewed as arbitrary. Some writers, however, deal with this as a
separate question. 118 It would seem to be merely another facet
which bears upon the market value.
Another factor which bears upon market value also, but which
117. Would not this cast some doubt as to the validity of referendums, which only
arise when a number of people (even though relatively small) are sufficiently aroused,
thereby causing other voters who are unschooled in the issues or the comprehensive plan to
vote against the challenged action of the city? Yet referendums seem to occupy an unreasonable and unjustified judicial sanctity. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Queen
Creek Land & Cattle Corp. v. Yavapai County Bd. of Supervisors, 108 Ariz. 449, 501 P.2d
391 (1972).
118. See P. RoHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS §1.0511], 1-85 (1978).
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is sometimes treated separately," 9 is the zoning classification and
the land use pattern in the immediate area. The reasonableness of
the application may well hinge on this factor, and courts properly
give it substantial weight. One major problem which arises in considering this question is whether the rezoning of an exterior lot will
result in a domino-like effect with regard to other property, as
where the incursion of a commercial zone across a primary or arterial street would result in the ultimate deterioration of a settled
residential area. Courts are often inclined to deny the rezoning request in such situations in spite of the economic consequences to
the exterior landowners. 120 On the other hand, if the surrounding
area has changed substantially since the original zoning classification, the shift in its nature may mandate rezoning. 2 '

A further factor which bears upon the reasonableness of the
request relates directly to the parcel itself. If it has remained undeveloped for many years while the balance of the area has developed
or has grown in a manner incompatible with the vacant property,
then this may be viewed as at least some evidence that the existing
zoning is improper.1 22 It is simply one factor, of course, since there
may be other reasons for the nondevelopment of the parcel.
Although these considerations all bear upon the question of
market value, in one way or another, any one of them might affect
the reasonableness of the decision, and thus the taking issue, without regard to the effect of the classification on market value.
Finally, aside from the state of development of the property or
its relation to other property in the area, there is the question of
the economic effect of publicly imposed conditions, independent of
zoning, which affect the feasibility of development. A subdivision
developer may find no problem with a single-family zoning classification because that is in accord with his plans. However, there are
additional costs which will coincide with the development as a result of what are commonly called "subdivision exactions." The development of the law pertaining to subdivision exactions has been
119. Id.
120. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Farr, 242 Md. 315, 218 A.2d 923 (1966); Wrigley
Properties v. City of Ladue, 369 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. 1963); Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of
Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954).
121. See Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949).
122. See LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Cook, 60 IlM. App. 2d 39, 208 N.E.2d 430
(1965).
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a creeping process. No one would think very much today about a
requirement that streets in a subdivision be paved, curbed and
guttered or that adequate water and sewer facilities be provided-but these are examples of older forms of subdivision exactions.12 Both the older forms and more recent nuances are predicated on the idea that this is the price that the developer pays to
have his plat approved and recorded and to receive the benefits
and services of being part of the municipal corporation. 12 4 The de-

velopers, of course, simply pass the added costs along to the land
purchasers or home buyers and take pleasure in the general attrac-

tiveness and utility of the development. In more recent years, however, the exactions have become more costly and less directly related to such fundamental needs as the movement of traffic, water
and whatever passes through a sewer. Some ordinances have required that the developer provide land for open space, parks, playgrounds or schools, or, in lieu thereof, pay a fixed amount of money
to the city for the purpose of defraying the ulitmate cost of such

public facilities which might be attributable to increased population growth resulting from the subdivision. Courts have both approved 25 and invalidated12 6 such requirements. The law regarding
when such requirements go so far as to be deemed arbitrary and
unreasonable or to constitute a taking, however, is still developing
and unsettled.1 27 Consider the following:

(a) A subdivision of any size increases traffic substantially in
its general area and places an added burden on the city with re123. See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956);
Allen v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920); Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal.
App. 2d 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951).
124. See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
125. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442,
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
126. See Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51
(1962). See also Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975).
127. The test applied in Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22
Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), and adopted in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28
Wisc. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966), was whether (assuming
the power was within the legislative authority given local governments by statute or otherwise) the burden placed upon the subdivider was "uniquely attributable" to his subdivision.
If not it would be a taking. In another case, the builders were entitled to recover that
amount of the subdivision exaction (paid under protest) that exceeded the portion of the
improvement properly allocable to the developers. Divan Builders v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J.
584, 334 A.2d 30 (1975).
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spect to the ultimate widening of major streets. Can the city require subdividers to dedicate land along the edges of the subdivision for the widening of major streets or to pay a fixed amount for
the widening of streets outside of but leading into the subdivision?
Is this reasonable or is it so onerous as to be considered arbitrary
and possibly a taking? If it is acceptable to require dedication of
land or the payment of a fixed amount to subsidize the city for
future park needs, then why is it any less reasonable to exact
money from subdividers to assist in alleviating problems that they
create outside of the subdivision but resulting from the development? 2 8 Obviously, this would increase the costs of land development, but otherwise, is not the municipality subsidizing the
subdividers?
(b) If a developing subdivision in a suburban community is so
large as to increase substantially the need for more police and
firefighting personnel and apparatus, would it not be reasonable to
exact a fee from the developers to compensate for that increased
burden?
(c) If a subdivision causes the city to have to replace or enlarge the water and sewer capacity in that area of the city leading
into the subdivision, is it not reasonable to exact a fee from the
developers to aid in compensating for that additional cost, which
otherwise would fall on the taxpayers in general? Otherwise, is not
129
the municipality subsidizing the subdivider?
It is apparent that there are countervailing arguments to the
foregoing which do not relate to the taking issue but pertain to the
potentially enormous cost of development which could result in the
stifling of growth. Thus, subdivision exactions in themselves could
become exclusionary devices by reason of the high cost of subdivision development and the resulting high cost of land or homes in
such developments. Such exactions could become more burdensome economically than large lot zoning if they were carried to an
extreme. It would also seem apparent that with regard to facilities
128.

The Divan court would approve a requirement pertaining to off-site improve-

ments to the extent that the subdivision is specially benefitted. Divan Builders v. Planning
Bd., 66 N.J. 584, 334 A.2d 30 (1975). The suggestion is made in Jordan that fees which are
paid must be used in such a manner as to benefit the subdivision which generated the fees.
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 4 (1966).
129. This is certainly the conclusion of the New Jersey court in Divan Builders v.
Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 584, 596-97, 334 A.2d 30, 37-38 (1975).
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and services outside of the subdivision, which serve other areas as
well, there is a serious taking question involved. If the "public
harm" and "public benefit" test is employed, it seems rather clear
that a public benefit is being derived at the expense of developers.
The argument to the contrary is that, but for the development, the
municipality would not have had to widen the arterial street going
in that direction or expand the sewer and water capacity. That this
argument is of doubtful validity is illustrated by the indication
from the cases that if fees paid in lieu of dedication of park land or
open space may be diverted to other uses or to other areas of the
city, then such fees are invalid. 13 0 In short, under the test which
courts have applied, the validity of exactions hinges upon their necessity being specifically attributable to the subdivision and upon
their use in benefiting the inhabitants of the subdivision.
In any event, the proliferation of the subdivision exaction device offers yet another instance in which the police power may be
carried to the point of becoming a taking.
B. The Continuing Imprecision of the Taking Issue.
Legal scholars still are in search of a set of rules or a formula
which will lend precision to a process which is doomed to imprecision by the state of the law. It is not a situation which is subject to
solution by a statute because about all the statute could accomplish would be to identify issues to be addressed or criteria to be
applied by the courts. 1' 3 It is the result of the fundamental rule
stemming from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,3 2 which condemns the process to permanent imprecision. Since a constitutional right is at stake, only a change in the interpretation of the
police power by the Supreme Court could lead to a more precise
rule.
130. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
131. But cf. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationof "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HRv.L. REv. 1165 (1967); Van Alstyne, Stat-

utory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of the Police Power, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 727 (1967) (suggesting that legislation of standards would aid in distinguishing be-

tween a valid police power regulation and a taking). It seems dubious, however, that such
statutes could go very far beyond providing general definitions and identifying already discernible criteria. Presumably, the scope of inquiry in these cases might be narrowed, the

type of evidence employed might be better identified, and some greater judicial precision
achieved.
132. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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The possibility that the Supreme Court would state that the
police power is to be upheld unless there is an actual physical taking, which some have advocated,3 3 seems unlikely. The trend of
the law of eminent domain, particularly in the inverse condemnation cases, has been in the other direction. 3 4 Examples of what
may or may not constitute a taking have been expanded rather extensively in recent years. 3 5 It would seem unlikely that in view of
the increased protection accorded property rights in condemnation
litigation, the courts would move in the opposite direction in enlargement of the police power at the expense of landowners. After
all, eminent domain and the police power are not that far apart. A
police power regulation results in a permitted, uncompensated taking in the sense that it is a diminution of the total property rights
of a landowner. It is distinguishable only on the theory that it is in
the interest of all the people and does not seriously affect the
rights of any individual, while a condemnation action is clearly di133. See F. BOssELmAN, D. CALLIES & J. BAN A, THE TAKING IssuE 255 (1973). See also
CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY TASK FORCE ON LAND USE AND URBAN
GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND 174-75 (1973).
134. This is particularly true in regard to transportation cases, with particular reference to those involving airports or aviation. This is illustrated by the airport cases cited in
note 105 supra, but it is highlighted in numerous other cases as well. For example, cases in
recent years have held that noise, dust, lights, gases, particulates and the like may not only
constitute a nuisance but may under certain circumstances amount to a taking. United
States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Kent County, 252 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966)(involving a freeway); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962)(involving an airport and non-trespassory flights); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391
P.2d 540 (1964) (also involving an airport). See also Batten v. United States, 292 F.2d 144
(10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963)(involving
damage caused by sonic booms in the Topeka, Kansas area around Forbes Air Force Base;
the court denied recovery).
135. Recent California cases illustrate this trend. Thus, in Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86, 603 P.2d 1329, 160 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1979),
a personal injury suit by homeowners based on nuisance allegations relating to excessive
noise from aircraft using the city airport was permitted by the supreme court, which held
the city not to be immune from nuisance liability. See also San Diego Unified Port Dist, v.
Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 361, 136 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1977), cert. denied sub. nom. Britt
v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 434 U.S. 859 (1977) (federal law preempts some state tort
law). A measurable reduction in market value due to operation of the airport in such a way
that aircraft noise substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of property is compensable. See Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974).
Damages may be recovered in inverse condemnation for unreasonable precondemnation activities by the city. See Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal. Rptr.
210 (1980). Acquiring the rights of billboard owners may require payment of just compensation. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, 39 Cal. App. 3d
804, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1974). But compare Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d
848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), approving a reasonable amortization period.
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rected at a specific landowner and is for the purpose of transferring all or a substantial part of.his rights to the public, thereby
transferring a privately owned asset to public ownership.
It is possible, of course, but not likely, that renewed attention
may be given to an infrequently employed and seemingly incongruous device-zoning with compensation."' 6 This seems to be a
rather peculiar concept because the valid exercise of the police
power through zoning does not require compensation, and compen-

sation is based on the idea that there has been a taking.137 Also, as
a practical matter, the vast majority of municipalities cannot afford to pay for their zoning activities and must let a zoning or rezoning action stand or fall on the reasonableness of it under the
police power. Thus, this seemingly strange but appealing device
seems unlikely to gain ground.
One approach that may be applied in limited situations and
which will probably be used more in the future, if the courts permit it, is the transfer of development rights or "TDR" device."s A
136. See State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 N.W.
885, 176 N.W. 159 (1919); and City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969), for
a discussion of this device. See also F. BossELuN, D. CALLIEs & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
ISSUE 302-17 (1973).
137. Kindle explains it in this way: "Zoning with compensation is a joint exercise of
the power of eminent domain and the police power. It is zoning with extraordinary consideration for the property owners involved for it compensates those whose property rights are
taken in the process, whereas in conventional zoning the individual who suffers hardship
because of special circumstances receives no compensation. While unusual, zoning with compensation is not without precedent in this state and elsewhere, and we find no constitutional
or statutory provision which prohibits the blending of the two powers (eminent domain and
police power) in the same legislative enactment if it is otherwise done in a constitutional
manner." City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Mo. 1969).
138. This device is discussed at length in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A
NEw TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE REGULATION (Rose ed. 1975). See also WINDFALLS FOR

WnoEouTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURe AND COMPENSATION 532-52 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski
eds. 1978); Carmichael, TransferableDevelopment Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control,
2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 35 (1974). The TDR device was considered by the New York Court of
Appeals in Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), and found wanting. The ordinance in that case would have
allowed transfer from a park area in Manhattan to other areas in mid-town Manhattan,
within certain boundaries. But the court viewed the rights thus transferred as "floating development rights" which existed only as abstractions until attached to specific property
which had not then been identified and was subject to contingent future approval by administrative agencies. Id. at 597-98, 350 N.E.2d at 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12. There was
potential for genuine economic loss, which the court regarded to be a taking. But see Penn
Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1977), in which the court took note of the earlier transfer of rights relative to Grand Central terminal in New York City through the grant of rights in airspace and its diminished
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developer may agree to maintain certain land in an undeveloped
state or in its current state or to develop on a low density basis in
return for development rights on some other piece of property
more amenable to intense development. One problem with this is
readily apparent-it has the earmarks of contract zoning, which is
both a form of spot zoning and an improper surrender of legislative
authority by the municipality, and is thus invalid.139 Other obvious
problems are that it may "float" until it finds a designated spot

and that landowners at the second location may have little to say
about it. 14o The benefits of the TDR, however, include the flex-

ibility that the device provides and its potential use in connection
with the preservation of historic sites or monuments.
In the end it would seem that we are left with simply identifying the criteria utilized by courts and building upon them on g,
case-by-case basis. That is the legacy of Pennsylvania Coal.

III. Compensation for a Taking Under the Police
Power
It has been said repeatedly by the courts that if the exercise of
the police power goes so far as to constitute a taking, it will not be
economic value in weighing the question of preserving the terminal as a landmark and
transferring development rights elsewhere.
139. Contract rezoning is clearly invalid. See Montgomery County v. National Capital
Realty Corp., 267 Md. 364, 297 A.2d 675 (1972). But some courts have distinguished conditional zoning from contract zoning and have upheld the former, which involves unilaterally
imposed conditions in a non-bargaining process.. See Arkenberg v. City of Topeka, 197 Kan.
731, 421 P.2d 213 (1966); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963);
Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960); State ex
rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970). The TDR device bears
some similarity to contract zoning in that the city is trading rights in another perhaps indefinable or unspecified area for non-development in the area involved. Aside from the problem that these rights may be of such uncertain value as to constitute a "taking," there is no
certainty that the development rights, if and when exercised in the second area, will conform to the comprehensive plan to the extent desired. Moreover, the process is akin to a
"deal" between the city and the developer to permit him to develop at point "B" if he will
agree to forego development at point "A." See Fred R. French Investing Co. v. City of New
York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 (1973).
140. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352
N.Y.S.2d 762 (1973).
141. See Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). For opposing views on the TDR device, see Marcus, Mandatory
Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of Manhattan's Tudor
City Parks,24 BuFiALo L. REv. 77 (1974); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York
City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
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permitted. Courts have traditionally applied that rule to invalidate
the particular zoning ordinance as applied to the particular property in question. This approach is the general interpretation of
both Euclid and Nectow.
In California, however, there have been in recent years a substantial number of inverse condemnation cases where the landowners sought damages because of the effect of a zoning ordinance on
the property in question. The leading case, which denies such relief
142
and holds to the traditional view, is Agins v. City of Tiburon.
Agins holds that a landowner who alleges a deprivation of substantially all of the use of his property may seek to have the ordinance
declared invalid, but may not seek damages in an inverse condemnation action and "thereby transmute an excessive use of police
power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid. 143
Agins stated what most lawyers had always believed-that
when the United States Supreme Court or state appellate courts
speak of a police power regulation as being so excessive as to be
confiscatory or to amount to a "taking," this simply provides a
basis for invalidation of the regulation. To do what landowner
Donald W. Agins argued would have an opposite effect in that it
would allow the regulation to stand and would require the court to
award just compensation for the loss the landowner would suffer
(or the court might alternatively invalidate the regulation as of
that time and compensate the landowner for his loss, if any, during
the time the regulation was in effect). Presumably, Agins had in
mind the former, that is, the recovery of full damages for his loss.
This would drastically change the nature of the game and the
stakes involved. It would not simplify this area of the law but complicate it. It would retard the use of the police power to a very
substantial degree and probably to the point of rendering it too
risky for cities to try anything other than conservative, established
forms of zoning regulation. Zoning, rezoning and other forms of administrative relief would be applied at the peril of the municipality. The undertaking of any inventive scheme of regulation would
have to be underwritten in the sense that the local government
would have to have enough funds available to pay for the conse142. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
143. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
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quences of a successful inverse condemnation action. Developers
and landowners, on the other hand, would have a very powerful
new weapon in their arsenal to assist them in achieving their goals.
Since the planning and zoning process is presently weighted in
favor of the developers and real estate interests (which fact is acknowledged by some courts)," 4 and the competing interests are not
equal, the burden on local and regional planning and zoning would
become unbearable. Thus, Agins' failure to prevail on this point in
the California Supreme Court was a most important decision from
a public policy standpoint.
This is not the only recent case in California, by any means, in
which a property owner or developer has sought damages through
allegations of inverse condemnation. One of the reasons would appear to be, as illustrated by Toso v. City of Santa Barbara,"4 5 that
damages are recoverable for inequitable precondemnation activities on the part of the municipality. Moreover, in another court of
appeal decision, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 it was held that a compensable taking had occurred due to
a combination of down zoning, the inclusion of the property in an
open space zone, lack of consistency by the city in following its
general plan, and overtures by the city to purchase the property
for open space. All of these elements taken together were deemed
sufficient to declare this to constitute a taking.14 7 The same court
of appeal, however, denied damages in an inverse condemnation
proceeding against San Diego brought because of floodway and
floodplain ordinances and the state's activities in connection with
48
plans for a specific project relating to a channel."

144. See, e.g., Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 164, 215 N.W.2d 179,
190 (1974)(Levin J., concurring); Fritt v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. Ct. App.
1961).
145. 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1980).
146. 80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 146 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1978).
147. The case was appealed to the California Supreme Court, which remanded it to
the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266,
598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afl'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The court of appeal, in an
unpublished decision, disallowed a damages remedy for inverse condemnation and the case
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court dismissed the case for want of
federal jurisdiction because the court of appeal had failed to determine whether a taking,
requiring invalidation of the ordinance as applied to the utility, had occurred. 49 U.S.L.W.
4317, 4320 (1981).
148. Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683
(1978).
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Other recent California cases, preceding Agins and involving
inverse condemnation, include suits by coastal landowners because
they were denied a permit to develop coastal property;14 9 a suit
seeking to invalidate the definition of "family" in the Santa Barbara ordinance; 15 0 an action for inverse condemnation because of a
declaration of intent by the city to amend its general plan;15 1 damages sought for the redesignation of property from residential and
commercial to agricultural open space, including compensation for
sewer facilities which the city had earlier required to be installed; 152 an inverse condemnation suit based on foothill land being placed in a permanent open space classification requiring tenabre homesites and public access; 5 3 an allegation that a rezoning
was for the purpose of acquiring open space at no cost to the
c6unty;'" an open space restriction in which the court noted the
fact that the property was used as a golf course and was leased for
that purpose until the year 2011;15 5 an inverse condemnation action challenging code provisions on sewage disposal in the Lake
Tahoe watershed; 6 a case in which the California Supreme Court
held that a lot which had decreased in market value due to the
adoption of a general plan was not taken or damaged under the
state constitution; 57 an action challenging certain cease and desist
orders issued by the water quality control board for the San Francisco bay area; 158 the challenge of exclusive agriculture zoning with
minimum 18-acre sizes where a prior recorded plat permitted 21/2 acre parcels; 59 an action against a county, alleging that zoning
based upon a floodplain ordinance amounted to a taking; 6 0 and a
149. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974);
Briggs v. State, 98 Cal. App. 3d 190 159 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1979).
150. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 90 Cal. App. 3d 606, 153 Cal. Rptr. 507

(1979).
151. Orsetti v. City of Fremont, 80 Cal. App. 3d 961, 146 Cal. Rptr. 75 (1978).
152. Furey v. City of Sacramento, 85 Cal. App. 3d 464, 149 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1978).
153. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
154. Pinheiro v. County of Matin, 60 Cal. App. 3d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
155. Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976).
156. Fallen Leaf Protection Ass'n v. South Tahoe Pub. Util. Dist., 46 Cal. App. 3d 816,
120 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1975).
157. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237,
125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
158. Morshead v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., 45 Cal. App. 3d 442,
119 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975).
159. Gisler v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
160. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
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suit involving the rezoning of land near an airport from residential
to industrial use. 161
Although these cases in large measure refuted as a remedy recovery of damages through inverse condemnation, some California
cases over the past fifteen years held that where the effect of the
action was to render the land valueless or practically so, a compensable taking had occurred. Thus, in one case in which land adjacent to an airport had been rezoned and the restrictions had been
continued beyond a certain date, this amounted to a taking. 6 2 The
result was to freeze development. As previously noted, airport zoning ordinances have been considerably less effective than zoning in
general, and it is not unusual for a court to view such ordinances as
a substitute for purchasing avigation easements or condemning adjoining land. The orthodox approach, however, is to strike down
the ordinance. In addition to the airport situation, the California
Court of Appeal has held that a restriction which is intended to
depress property value because of contemplated eminent domain
proceedings would amount to inverse condemnation. 163 This is a
form of "precondemnation activity" which is impermissible.
Generally speaking, however, California, prior to Agins, had
not accepted the inverse condemnation approach to land use regulations. As one court of appeal case stated, recognized exceptions
to the requirement that compensation be paid for damage to property exist (a) when the damage results from the proper exercise of
the police power, and (b) when a public entity has the legal right
to cause damage to property to the same extent as a private person." The California Supreme Court had long held, prior to
Agins, that in the use of "the right of eminent domain, private
property may not be taken without compensation therefor,
whereas, in the exercise of the police power, the use of the property may be restricted or it may even be destroyed, and no legal
liability arises to compensate the owner therefor."""
Thus, it would seem that despite these recent inverse condem161. Smith v. County of Santa Barbara, 243 Cal. App. 2d 126, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1966).
162. Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969).
163. See Department of Pub. Works v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 33 Cal. App. 3d
960, 109 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1973).
164. See Amador Valley Investors v. City of Livermore, 43 Cal. App. 3d 483, 117 Cal
Rptr. 749 (1974).
165. Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350, 355, 287 P. 455, 456 (1930) (citing Gray v. Reclamation Dist., 174 Cal. 622, 638, 163 P. 1024, 1031 (1917) and other cases).
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nation suits, the California courts have rather steadily adhered to
the policy enunciated in the Agins decision. It would, moreover,
appear that this is the wiser and better approach. To do otherwise
would serve to vitiate most of the reasoned efforts on the part of
planners to cope with the increasing public need to regulate land
for the public benefit.
Conclusion
Adoption of the legal concept that damages can be awarded in
an inverse condemnation suit as the result of the exercise of the
police power would result in a very substantial diminution in the
use of the police power and in the ability of the public to control
land development and to impose requirements for the public welfare. The California Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon""
quite properly denied this form of relief.
Moreover, the arguments of Agins and of other California
plaintiffs with regard to inverse condemnation obfuscate the taking
issue rather than offer a solution to it. The question of when exercise of the police power extends so far as to constitute a taking
would still remain under the existing case law. The upholding of
Agins' position would have had only the effect of making local governments or public entities very cautious in the use of the police
power. They would retreat to the safety of proven regulations sanctioned by stare decisis. If this had been the meaning of Euclid and
Nectow, very likely no one would have proposed the planned unit
development, the cluster zone, or the floating zone, and even if
those efforts had received the prior blessing of developers, it is
highly unlikely, that environmental concerns or regulation of
coastal and inland waterways would ever have been risked.
The price that Agins urged and California rejected is too high
to pay. To condone the concept of inverse condemnation in this
area of the law is to deny the very first of the maxims of equity,
which recognizes that the public interest must be the first concern
16 7
of the law.

Moreover, in dealing with land use regulations, it must be
166. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
167. Salus Populi Est Suprema Lex. "Regard for the public welfare is the highest
law." H. BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS 1 (10th ed. 1939).
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remembered that this is a process dependent entirely on the ability
to exclude certain uses. To be sure, such exclusion cannot be motivated by racial considerations. New Jersey is at least correct that
the process should not be directly affected by economic considerations.""8 Exclusion should not operate as a device to penalize or
deprive anyone. But exclusionary regulations are an essential component of land use regulation, and the ability to exclude should not
be vitiated by the necessity of making retribution in damages for a
resultant mistake. There is an historic difference in the law of
eminent domain and the police power, and it must continue to be
recognized if any effective power is to be left to employ for the
public welfare.

168. South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336
A.2d 713 (1975).

